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ABSTRACT
A NUCLEAR SPACE power system -- the SP-100 - is
being developed for future missions where large
amounts of electrical power will be required.
Although it it primarily intended for unmanned
spacecraft, it can be adapted to a manned space
platform by tethering it above the station through
an electrical transmission line which isolates the
reactor for away from the inhabited platform but
convoys its abundant power back to where it is
needed. The transmission line, used in conjunc-
tion with an instrument rated shield, attenuates
reactor radiation in the vicinity of the space
station to less than one-one hundredth of the
natural background which is already present. Thia
combination of shielding and distance attenuation
is less than one-tenth the mass of boom-mounted or
onboard man-rated shields that are required whr .
the reactor is mounted nearby. This paper
describes how connection is made to the platform
(configuration, operational requirements) and
introduces a new element -- the coaxial transmis-
sion tube -- which enables efficient transmission
of electrical power through long tethers in space.
Design methodology for transmission tubes and tube
arrays is discussed. An example conceptual design
is presented that shows SP-100 at three power
levels -- 100 kWe, 300 kWe, and 1000 kWe -- con-
nected to space station via a 2 km HVDC transmis-
sion line/tether. Power system performance, mass,
and radiation levels are estimated with impacts on
space station architecture and operation. Specif-
ically, a tethered nuclear power system weighing
from 4-1/2 to 25 metric tone, including tether and
shield, can deliver 100 to 1000 kWe continuously
for 7 yr with o reactor attributable radiation
flux, as measured in the immediate vicinity out-
side the station, of less than 3 mrem per hr.
Compared with solar power sources, the tethered
SP-100 offers considerable simplification to space
station architecture, orientation and operations
and reduces orbital drag, at equivalent power
levels, by factors ranging from 2.6 to 53.
INTRODUCTION
As the space, statior program moves forward
towards the next century its emphasis will expand
beyond the present modest goal of continuous man-
ned presence in low earth orbit for scientific
research and observations, to more ambitious
objectives which treat near-earth space an an
environment to be exploited, rather than just s
frontier to be explored.. With the coming indus-
trial experiments that are now being planned,
there is a growing realization that more facility
power will be required onboard than has previously
been considered for space station.
The 10C (Initial Operating Capability) sta-
tion of the Reference Configuration Descrip-
tiun,(1)* shown in Fig. 1, is solar powered, in
the form of large photovoltaic arrays and regener-
ative hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells for storage.
Solar thermal power systems are also under con-
sideiation, since their collection is more effi-
cient and thus requires less area, giving it the
capability to grow to somewhat higher power levels
than photovoltaice (the solar thermal power system
option for the IOC station, at 80 kWe, is tabu-
lated alongside the 75 kWo photovoltaic implemen-
tation for ^omparison in Table 1 ). They would
use a heat engine (Drayton, Rankine or Stirling)
combined with receiver thermal storage to allow
continuous operation through the dark side of the
orbit. According to the mission requirements
working group (MWRG) mission model (2), onboard
power demand will grow steadily from the IOC
installed capability of 75 kWe to 300 kWe by the
year 2000.
This transition from IOC to growth apace
station raises the issue of sources. For modest
power levels (within 100 kWe) in low earth orbit,
it is generally ag+;eed that solar sources are. the
easiest to imples-.rt despite the collector area,
sun tracking mechaiisms and dark side energy
*Numbers in parentheses designate references at
end of paper.
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storage that is required. But as facility power
domgnd rises past this level, implementation of
solar power becomes increasingly difficult. This
is due mainly to the linearly increasing amounts
of collector area that are required to provide
higher power. Growth to 300 kWe will entail a
roughly fourfold in­ ease in power system mass
and drag cross asction over the 10C. Growth to a
megawatt will multiply these penalties by a factor
of 13.
Clearly, power demand will grow as the apace
station matures. It will probably grow beyond the
300 kWo currently predicted, which is based upon
the MWhG analysis of currently anticipated space
station missions. The mission model is considered
the most reasonable estimate available but it is
conservative since it only considers those mis-
sions moot likely to be approved within antici-
pated programmatic and funding constraints, not
the full set of all missions, including potential
commercial opportunities, which are included in
its date base. The 300 kWe estimate does not
allow for unanticipated power demands, such as
might occur following better-than-expected results
from a materials processing experiment. Potential
for growth is a fundamental part of continuous
manned presence in space; therefore, a desirable
attribute fnr space station is the flexibility to
accommodate unplanned growth. When the electrical
power consumptions associated with such potential
industrial operations as RF induction basting
container-lees melt processing era considered,
there is strong incentive to look at power sources
that can accommodate this gruwth, at the multi-
hundred kWe level, more readily than solar.
THE SP-100 POWER SOURCE
There is a nuclear space power system now
under development that could meet all of the known
(and currently projected) apace station needs.
This power system, known as the SP-100 0
 is the
nuclear reactor system that is being developed
jointly by the DOD, NASA and the DOE for future
space missiuns, both civil and military, where
Large amounts of onboard power will be required
(3). Initial focus has been on the 100 kWe class
space power system, but its technology is scale-
able to higher power. The technology development
program, which has been recently taken in under
the aegis of the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), essentially continues work originally begun
in the late 1950's, then almost abandoned after
the Apollo era, to develop high performance sux-
iliary space power sources. The SP-100 program
timetable coincides roughly with the launch and
early operations of the IOC station. In its
present stage of development, SP-100 is a generic
class of reactor power system because there are
several combinations of reactor and conversion
technologies that can be used (4). The system
shown in Fig. 2 is based on liquid metal cooled
reactor technology and free-piston Stirling power
conversion. Other SP-100 system designs include:
(1) liquid metal cooled reactor/thermoulectric
direct conversion
(2) liquid metal cooled reactor/in-core
thenaionica
(3) liquid metal cooled reactor/brayton
turbogenerator
All of these designs are directed to meet the
specifications given in Table 2. At 100 kWe
delivered to the user, they will weigh less than
3000 kg and will occupy, in stowed configuration
before deployment, Ices than one-third of the
space shuttle cargo bay. Table 3 gives a repre-
sentative mass break •lown, at three output power
levels, of SP-100.* The 100 kWe System is a
"generic" baseline design sized ca meet the
Table 2 requirements. The 300 kWe system is a
"growth version" which would result if the base-
line technology 100 kWo design was scaled to
300 kWe, The 1000 kWe system extends the scaling
to mndaw"Lt size, uonrly the Inrgust complate
cys:em that can be deployed from thv orbiter pay-
load bay without resorting to on-orbit assembly.
Compared to other space power systems in this
range, the unmanned nuclear system is lighter and
more compact, mainly because of its internal
energy source -- a fission reactor -- and because
the reactor is not shielded like the terrestrial
nuclear system. On earth the reactor must be
totally surroun&-d by shielding and containment,
to prevent release of fission products and life-
threatening radiation to the environment. In
space, however, there is essentially no environ-
ment to protect and, if the system is not manned,
no human life to endanger. The radiation shield
can therefore be minimal -- a barrier between the
reactor and the more vulnerable components that
reside with the balance of plant and nearby user
payload. The shield provides a "shadow" which
attenuates reactor radiation ,just enough to limit
the accumulating physical damage to a level com-
mensurate with reasonable confidence the equipment
will survive. For an SP-100 instrument-rated
shadow shield, the dose plane specification (6)
measured 25 m behind the shield as shown in Fig. 3
is:
Accumulated gamma dosage: 5x'.0 5
 red
Fast neutrons absorbed:
	 1013 nvt
over an operational lifetime of 7 yr. This is a
reduction of about five orders magnitude from the
unahielded reactor radiation flux, and in human
dosage is equivalr.nt to about 15 rem per hr --
certainly a fatal dose rate, if it is allowed to
accumulate over a few hours time.
For unmanned missiona, this shielding
practice is adequate because all hardware,
including the power conversion system and
radiator, is located behind the reactor and
*Rased on Stochl and Green (5) and corollary
scaling relationships.
within the shadow created by the shield. The user
spacecraft also lies within the shadow, behind the
power system, to prevent backbcatter of the out-of-
shadow radiation into the shadow zone. Whenthe
user subsystems are of large dimension, such as
radar antennae or low temperature radiators, the
power system is translated forward further by 10
to 50 motors on an extended boom so that the diam-
eter of the shadow cone -- which subtends a solid
angle of 35° to 70 0 -- widens enough to mask these
surfaces as well. As distance behind the shield
is increased, the radiation is also further ntten-
unted according to the well-understood inverse-
square law.
Since the shadow extends only in a conical
zone surrounding the s pacecraft, any vehicle that
uses this power system creates an exclusion zone
everywhere outside the shadow, that prevents an
approach by manned spacecraft once the reactor Iles
been unlocked end gone critical. At any location
near the reactor powered spacecraft, the intense
radiation field produced by the unshielded,
operating reactor precludes human intervention.
MANNED SPACE STATION
Historically, the reactor power systems
designs meant for manned apace platforms, includ-
ing previous SP-100 space station integration
studies (7), have focused on heavily shielded
reactors located in close proximity to the station
itself; from onboard "flying submarine" configura-
tions that are fully surrounded by four-pi
spherical shields (Fig. 4(a)), to boom-mounted
configurations (Fig. 4(b)) that jut out from the
station a few meters away so that shielding thick-
nuss facing away from the epececraft may be
reduced somewhat, saving some weight. In all
these configurations the reactor is fully sur-
rounded; the shielding thickness is that which
reduces the radiation dose received by an astro-
naut during his tenure aboard the station to an
arbitrarily determined maximum. This exposure
limit, currently considered to be the largest dose
that can be safely accumulated by a healthy astro-
nnut with no permanent bone marrow damage, is cur-
rently set at 35 rem over a 90 day period (8).
Thin is equivalent to an average dose rate of
16.2 mrcm/hr.
The radiation exposure limit exerts a lever-
aged influence on shield mass since it is a limit
on total exposure from all sources, including the
natural background radiation of apace (Table 4).
Background radiation varies greatly with orbital
position and time, and averages about 400 mrem/hr
at the space station's orbit. Within the space-
craft interior thin dose rate is attenuated by
about two orders of magnitude. If the background
dose rate seen inside the spacecraft is 4 mrcm/hr,
then, the present total exposure limit can allow
up to 12 additional mrcm/hr to be budgeted for
the reactor, which exposes the astronaut to four
times the background dose rate he would get if no
reactor were present. If the total allowable
dose were lowered for any reason, however (not an
unreasonable expectation since 16 mrcm/hr is over
five times the equivalent rate dose allowed by
civil occupational guidelines!), the incremental
amount of this reduction would be taken preferen-
tially from the reactor's radiation allowance.
In this example, a 50 percent reduction of total
allowable would force the reactor budget to drop
by a factor of three, while P reduction of totnl
allowable to 5 mrem/hr would force it to drop by
a factor of 12. This represents a significant
weight penalty for the conventional man-rated
nuclear system, since the shield is already its
largest component.
The onboard four-pi shield of the (7) "sub-
marine" configuration, which must attenuate
reactor radiation some ten orders of magnitude
to achieve a reactor-attributed dose rate less
than 5.72 mrcm/hr at a distance of 3 meters from
the reactor module, weighs 35 to 45 metric tons.
That is more than 15 times the mass of all the
other power system components combined. The
boom-mounted reactor shield, which keeps the
5.72 mrcm/hr dose rate within the spacecraft but
allows 200 mrem/hr in any direction away from
the spacecraft at 30 meters distance, weighs only
16 to 18 metric tone; this is still more than
five timea the weight of the other components.
Nuclear systems provide power in a compact pnck-
age, but the price of operating them in close
proximity to man is high.
TETHERED NUCLEAR SPACE STATION
A different approach to reactor integration
with manned platforms would be to treat the
manned platform as a special case of the unmanned
spacecraft, and use distance instead of shielding
to provide the necessary attenuation. Suppose
that a non-man rated nuclear power system were
used, but that the payload -- apace station in
this case -- were put behind the power system at
a very long distance inatde the shadow. If the
power system was 2 km away, for example, the
shadow zone surrounding the station would be over
I km wide -- plenty of room for a space station.
The reactor radiation flux passing through that
zone immediately outside the station would be,
(Table 4) due to the combination of shielding and
distance, less than 3 mrem/hr. That is Less than
one-one hundredth (1/100) of the average natural
background radiation flux that is already present
at the space station's planned orbital location.
An astronaut aboard this station could therefore
expect to receive a radiation dose that is essen-
tially the some as what he would receive aboard a
non-nuclear powered station.
Implementation of this approach leads to the
space station concept shown in Fig. 5. The power
system is connected to the space station via a
tether which is also an electrical transmission
line. It generates electrical power, and emits
radiation and where heat. Power goes via the
transmission line to the space station where it
is used. The combined spacecraft -- power system
and apace elation elements -- or constellation,
flies in a gravity gradient stabilized orbit.
All elements of the constellation are line-
oriented along the local gravity gradient and
held together by tension. They are distributed
around the combined spacecraft center of mass.
The living quarters and its associated life sup-
port systems are located at the lowest position
in the string, counterbalancing the power system.
Docking and zero gravity industrial facilities
are located to coincide with the center of mass.
Two kilometers above this grouping, at the top of
the constellation, is the SP-100. Its position
and trajectory are superorbital. While the sta-
tion below is inhabited and the zone surrounding
it a site of much activity, the power system is
unmannei and the zone surrounding it is an exclu-
sion zone.
It is possible to extend the tethered con-
figuration to much longer lengths. This may be
desired as a means for providing modest levels
of artificial gravity on board the lower station
modules. Figure b shows the levels of artifi-
cial gravity that can be attained when the lower
module flies suborbital, tethered below the com-
bined spacecraft center of mass (circular orbit).
The tether/transmission line considered here
is only long enough to provide radiation attenua-
tion, however. The orbit differential between
SP-100 and the station is not sufficient to pro-
vide much artificial gravity, but it is suffi-
cient to ensure separation between the reactor
and manned platform, and stable orbital flight.
The dynamics of this configuration have not been
fully characterized, but are similar to the
tethered satellite (11) which has been treated
at some length (the reader is directed to the
summary article by Bekey (12)) in the literature.
The nuclear source does not require large
arrays of moving solar collectors or dark side
energy storage. Orbital drag is reduced, and the
EVA exclusion zones associated with Baler concen-
trators and waste heat from thermal power systems
are no longer a dominant consideration. Shuttle
approach, maneuvering and docking are simplified
and manned EVA, including sesembly of large
structures, is facilitated. The space station is
allowed more freedom in its attitude and orien-
tation since the only requirements imposed are
those related to gravity gradient stablized
flight.
The configuration offers advantages over con-
ventional nuclear concepts because, while the
abundant power produced by the nuclear source
comes down the tether to the platform, the
intense radiation and waste heat do not. The
rector is located a safe distance away from the
active portion of space station where operations
and experiments take place; therefore it does not
interfere with these activities, nor does it
impose, aside from the need to maintain a balance
about the desired center of mesa, architectural
constraints on new construction.
The tethered nuclear concept overcomes two of
the traditional drawbacks associated with space
reactor power systems used for manned platforms
(shielding weight, onboard radiation). It does
not escape, however, the other critical issues
which confront operation of space reactors in low
earth orbit. These include considerations of
policy, safety, environmental and radiological
hnzards, and concern for what happens to the
reactor after it has been used. Due to these
concerns there has developed, within the United
States and internationally, a body of regulations
which impose strict requirements on how space
reactors are launched and operated.
International law, which in embodied in the
United Nations "Guidelines concerning the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources in outer Space," imposes
general requirements aimed at minimizing the
radiological risk to the world's population from
nuclear missions, and ensuring that no individual
within that population, whether connected with
its operation or not, is exposed beyond currently
recognized safe exposure limits.
U.S. policy is more specific. Before a
reactor powered apace mission can be approved it
must be subject to rigorous safety analysis that
determines probabilities and consequences of
accident and exposure events, and the potential
risks to personnel, the world's population, aid
the environment. Every mission is considered
individually, on a case by case basis. During
each phase of its development the nuclear powered
mission must undergo thorough reviews, by three
independent government bodies. The operator must
show that the nuclear system's launch and sub-
sequent operation will present no undue risks,
and that the remaining risks are justified by the
benefits of the mission. Final approval author-
ity for launch of the spacecraft rests with the
President. These safety restrictions pose devel-
opment obstacles not faced by other space power
technologies. But they are a necessary part of
reactor power system use, because of the hazards
involved with nuclear materials, and the severe
consequences of radiological exposure to human
life. Whether it is to be used for manned or
unmanned missions, every space reactor must be
designed within these restrictions.
To assure safety during launch and deploy-
ment, apace reactors are mechanically designed
so their elements will remain locked in the sub-
critical position (unlike isotope sources the
fission reactor does not become highly radio-
active until after it ties gone critical and fis-
sion products are created) even if there is an
accident At the launch pad, or the launch is
aborted and the reactor core gets damaged or
submerged (a major consideration since water is
a moderator). The reactor cannot be unlocked
until it has arrived at the orbit where it will
be used.
On-orbit safety is observed by keeping the
power system in its inert state through deploy-
ment, and by not putting the reactor into criti-
cal configuration until it is on station, far
away from any manned vehicles. For an unmanned
nuclear spacecraft launched from shuttle, the
01
reactor is not unlocked or powered up until the
spacecraft line completed its transfer to final
mission orbit. For Lho tethered SP-100, the
reactor will not be unlocked until well after
its installation, including construction of the
tether/transmission line, has been completed.
Tile deployment sequence, which requires further
stvdy to clarify several issues, involves assem-
bling the transmission line from prefabricated
sections previously brought on-site. These sec-
tions may be fully modularized or may require
additional fabrication before they are joined.
Next, the inert SP-100 power system will be taken
to the site and installed. On-site system integ-
rity chocks and pre-operational tests will take
place to the extent that they are required, but
reactor testing at power will not occur until the
crewmen have retreated to the manned zors.
Operational safety during the nuclear powered
mission involves different concer-as when manned
missions are considered versus unmanned missions.
For the unmanned system, operational safety is a
concern that only extends to ensuring that the
spacecraft and its equipment are sufficiently
protected to carry out the mission. For the man-
ned space station power sourci, however, opera-
tional safety extends much farther than the
mission itself because there is human life in the
vicinity of the operating reactor (even though it
is located some distance away). Radiation emn-
nati,q from the exposed rector creates an exclus-
ion zone extending several kilometers in all
directions (Fig. 7) from the reactor side of the
shield. EVA is not permitted inside this zone;
manned vehicles must avoid it unless they are
shielded. Normally all traffic remains below
this area, inside the shadow zone.
For the shuttle approaching space station for
orbital rendezvous, additional shielding require-
ments are imposed since the shuttle must confine
its approch trajectory to remain entirely within
the shadow zone, and the shadow must extend far
enough to ensure that the approaching vehicle
does not get a higher dose rate than the station.
In order to maintain a uniform dose plane that
extends along the space station orbital track
from the docking port (the approaching spacecraft
does not rise above the along-track trajectory
during rendezvous), it is necessary to provide
additional off-axis shield attenuation which
tapers off gradually according to off-axis cone
angle cosine squared. This additional "shaped
shadow" edge attenuation increases shield mass by
about 50 percent over the "sharp-edged cutoff"
shield (70° cone angle) a penalty which is reason-
abla, considering the low mass of instrument
rated shields.
Operational safety extends to the end of the
mission, and leads to the question of how the
reactor will be disposed of when it reaches the
end of its useful life, or has failed. During
its operation the reactor has generated an inven-
tory of actinides and fission products, trans-
muted compounds which are not only highly
radioactive but also chemically hazardous; much
more so than the unirradiated fuel originally
loaded. It is not desirable to have these mate-
riala re-introduced to earth. In time they will
undergo a process of radioactive decay which
eventually results in final compounds less haz-
ardous, but this time is measured in centuries.
If the spent reactor is allowed to re-onter at
all, it is better to lot the deeny process take
place in space, not earth's biosphere. To ensure
that this happens, the regulations restrict oper-
ation of nuclear spacecraft to orbits of high
enough altitude to be considered "nuclear safe;"
that is, an orbit whose lifetime exceeds 400 yr,
sufficient time for them to decay. For SP-100'a
ballistic coefficient thib is equivalent to a
circular orbit greater than 700 km altitude.
The regulations permit operation at altitudes
lower than this, but only under the condition
that the spent reactor is re-boosted to nuclear
sale orbit after its mission has been completed.
Since the space station operates at lower
altitude, a tethered power system must include a
means to remove and reboost its reactor to
nuclear safe orbit; one that to demonstrably
effective under all conditions. Whether it is
disposing of
	 reactor that worked flawlessly
throughout its life, or getting rid of one that
suddenly failed, the provision for reboost must
be virtually guaranteed; otherwise the tethered
concept is not acceptable. Operating a reactor
in low earth orbit carries a significant opera-
tional concern since, as events have shown, auto-
matic re-boost methods do not always work.
For the tethered SP-100, end-of-life disposal
will probably entail removing the entire power
system and replacing it with a new unit. Part or
all of the transmission line may be affected.
Considering the high degree of integration for
this power system, and the damage it will have
accumulated over its lifetime from radiation,
meteoroids, and material degradation, this
appears to be the most expedient approach.
Outage will be minimized by maintaining one or
more non-nuclear backup power systems for (non-
industrial) essential loads, and keeping a opera
system (new, unused, inert reactor) with a stock-
pile of tether sections on-orbit.
Disposal under normal conditions may be
accomplished by remote teleoperntors and built-iri
mechanisms that sever the tether connection. The
teleoperator ensures that the discarded unit is
attached to an orbital transfer vehicle (DIV) and
that reboost is properly initiated. The OTV may
be nothing more than a battery of electric
thrusters, attached to the power system and
energized by its residual capacity, that will
propel it in an outwardl y
 winding sp'.ral path
over several mouths, to safe orbit. Once the
radioactive unit has been removed from the site,
its replacement can be installed by manned EVA.
Under emergency conditions reactor disposal
can be accomplished by one of several possible
means. The tethered SP-100 allows considerable
latitude in response to unanticipated events
because, unlike a robot spacecraft, the payload
is a manned utility platform. Countermeasures
can be improvised as necessary when automatic
systems fail and normal disposal moons cannot be
used. Consider a worst case, for example, an
event where tl,c system fella at full power, dam-
aging or destroying itself to the extent where no
signal- or response to commando occur, and where
radiation prevents clean enough approach to
nations the damage. Title event is an emergency
because primary power is loot. Out it is not a
life-threatening situation. The accident Bite is
remote end immediate reaction to it is not neose-
sary. If all other methods fail, the damaged
reactor can be disposed of by manned EVA, without
hazard, from the immediate vicinity of the sta-
tion. This is done by attaching an OTV to the
tether directly above where it connects to the
platform, than cutting the power system free
SP-100, tether, attached OTV and all. It will
drift upwards seeking a new apogee, an additional
12 km in this case, while the station drifts
downwards by a lesser amount. When the two
bodies are sufficiently separated, the OTV can
be fired, towing the discarded power plant away.
SPACE TRANSMISSION LINE
Implementation of the tethered SP-100 nuclear
powered space station concept requires develop-
ment of the tether/transmission line. While
structural requirements for this tether, based
on the forces required to hold the 3000 kg power
system in its superorbital position 2 km above
the constellation center of mass, might be met by
a common household extension cord (a restraining
tension of only 22 at (5 lb) is necessary in the
absence of perturbations), electrical power
transmission requirements dictate a more complex
structure. For efficient transmission with low
mass, the line must be high voltage. It must
operate in the plasma environment of near earth
space and, at lower orbital inclinations, will
sweep out high values of geomagnetic flux. ThL
environment renders conventional high voltage
practice unworkable, since the space plasma,
which varies in density with altitude (Fig. 8)
essentially limits the voltages used on exposed
conductor surfaces to 100 to 200 V in low earth
orbit (14). Conventional spacecraft electrical
design practice avoids the plasma breakdown
phenomenon by resorting to lower voltages, and
allowing some corona lose to the plasma. For a
2 km transmission line, however, this would lead
to excessive conductor cross section. The trans-
mission line must not only be a high voltage
line, but it must be electrically isolated from
the plasma over its length.
Due to the uncertain behavior of the space-
craft plasma interactions over the transmission
line's length and potential drop, conventionally
shielded cables or paired wires with layered
insulation will probably not be adequate.
Insulation materials degrade quickly in the
active ion and thermal environment; pinholes,
breaks or other openings may, depending on the
electric field seen locally by the plasma, give
rise to focused leakage currents several times
clw thermally predicted density, loading to fur-
ther ionization and breakdown (15). Arcing will
permanently damage a conventional cable. If its
electrical insulation must cope not only with the
Stresses of power transmission, which are known,
but also the spacecraft plasma interactions,
which are to some extent still unknown, the
material requirements for this insulation may
pose unacceptable development riek for the
tether/tranamiosi.on line.
That risk can bu avoided, however, if the
transmission line high voltage insulation can be
divorced from spncecraft plasma interactions.
This is the approach taken here. The electrical
ernes section of the terrestrial transmission
line's wires is re-conf :gured, into a pair of
solid wall concentric tubes (Fig. 9). Thon, the
power circuit is arranged so that the inside tube
is used to carry high voltage from the source to
the load, while the outside tube provides the
return path. Figure 10 illustrates how the
source-to-user connection it made for the
tothered SP-100. The outside tube becomes an
extension of the spacecraft hull, and is ground
for source and loads. Power system voltage gra-
dients do riot come into contact with the space
plasma, but are confined to the annular region
between the tubes. The transmission line is
insulated by maintaining a vacuum in this region
or, alternatively, by filling it with pressurized
gas.
This conductor geometry, the coaxial tube,
comprises the basic element of the space power
transmission line. It consists of two concentric
tubes, or a solid rod inside a tube, held in
place by open frame shielded spacers, and iso-
lated from each other by an annular gap.
Vacuum is the preferred choice of insulation
for the gap because it is essentially weightless
(other than the equipment required to maintain
it) and it is the most rugged form of insulation.
A properly prepared vacuum gap of modest dimen-
sion (3 mm to 3 cm) will hold off einusoidally
alternating voltages up to 50 peak kV/cm separa-
tion; it can also withstand, when properly con-
ditioned, up to 80 kV/cm do (16). What is
necessary for vacuum insulation is to maintain a
pressure low enough that the mean free path
inside the annulus exceeds the gap distance by
an order of magnitude or better -- the Paschen
limit. For centimeter gaps, a pressure less
than 10-5
 is required. That is a pressure higher
than the naturally occurring space vacuum at
500 km altitude, which suggests that vacuum
insulation for this line might be achieved by
simply exposing the unassembled tube sections to
space and baking them out prior to assembly.
Pressurized gas could also be used as an
insulating medium for the gap. At 1 ATM, both
Freon 12 (CCL12F2) and sulfur hexaflor• ide (SF6)
have dielectric breakdown strengths of approxi-
mately 75 kV/cm, about two and one-half times
the value for dry air. This is close enough to
the breakdown gradient for vacuum that, from an
electrical insulation standpoint, gas could be
considered interchangeable with vacuum even
though the physical mcchnniama leading to blank-
down are different. Resorting to pressurized
gas would add the complication of reservoirs,
pumping and pressure monitoring systumo to the
transmission line; on the other hand, it would
allow higher line currents due to improved heat
transfer. Cap geometry and dimensions would not
be affected.
Regardless of the insulating media chosen,
however, the coaxial tube's annular gap provider
electrical isolation for the transmission line
that 1160 several practical advantages. Its
breakdown behavior is that of a spark gap; that
is, standoff capacity does not degrade with use.
Unlike dielectric insulators, the gap in a prop-
erly designed system can tolerate repeated over-
voltage and arcing with no loss of standoff
capacity. That is because the ere, due to the
plasma locally formed, is a relatively 1.ew
resistance path compared to the condurtor mote-
rial leading to and from it. When an me is
struck, its energy will dissipate over a much
larger bulk volume than the surface point it
touches. Experiments involving repeated dis-
charges in vacuum over 2.00 kV and 40 kA peak
(17) have shown that only minute quantities of
electrode surface are vaporized compared to the
bulk energy which is dissipated. Once the arc
is allowed to extinguish itself and the localized
ion cloud to dissipate, the system returns to its
former state unchanged. The flashover behavior
of the annular gap is repeatable, and can be
controlled by design.
The primary consideration is to ensure that
arcing, when it does occur, will take place
across a void and not along any surface bridging
the two conductors (For example, dielectric
standoffs). The coaxial tube &operators
(Fig. 11) which support the core inside the
Jacket tube employ a standoff design that was
demonstrated for terrestrial high voltage vacuum
transmission (18). The standoffs (glass beads)
are attached to both aides of an intermediate
cylinder (which is electrically floating) which
masks them from the walls and forms a positively
located equipotential surface. The arcs are
forced to cross the gap at the edge of this
shield; keeping them outside the shielded region
and preventing them from tracking along the bead
surface.
DESIGN METHODOLOGY
The apace transmission line assembly consists
of a regularly spaced array of several tubes,
grouped in parallel, and enclosed by a cylindri-
cal meteoroid bumper (Fig. 12). This configura-
tion is the result of an iterative design
process, which takes into account the following
requirements according to the rationale presented
below:
POWER TRANSMISSION - The line is designed to
convey the specified power over the required
distance, at a fixed percentage of loss, with
minimum mass. Methodology in equivalent to ter-
roatrial practice in that the allowed power loss
leads to selection of a working voltnga and elec-
trical cross section. Equal areas are assigned
to the forward and return paths (core and
Jncket). Although their dinmeter ratio (core OU
to Jacket ID) is fixed by minimum L field consid-
erations, the overall tube dinmeters result
directly from selection of working voltage since
they are sized to an L field limit (typically
30 kV/cm). The electrical cross sections
obtained cnn, depending on other requirements,
be configured into a single tube or an array of
several parallel thinwall tubes. Aluminum is
the conductor material chosen since it line the
highest specific strength for its conductivity.
METLOROID HAZARD - Based on the more pessi-
mistic estimates of plasma interaction with
spacecraft structures over potentials of several
kilovolts, it is assumed that a single meteoroid
puncture could disable a tube. Therefore the
tube must be so heavily armored an to prevent
its being punctured by the largest meteoroid it
mny encounter, or it must be paralleled with
other tubes. Generally, an array of redundant
tubes in used since redundant elements usually
give a lower overall system maea and provide a
known margin of reserve capacity. The method-
ology used is similnr to the meteoroid survival
approach developed for hart pipe radiators (19,
20), where probability that a given number will
survive out of on original population of identi-
cal elements is a binomial distribution function
of the number of nlamants and the survival proba-
bility of a single individual tube.
The transmission tube must be designed to
resist puncture by all meteoroids no larger than
n certain size. This size, which is an upper
limit on what the transmission line can be
expected to encounter during its life, is eati-
met ad by the meteoroid flux distribution model
(21):
log Nt u -14.37 - 1.213 log M
where N t is number
of particles of mass
M or greater (M is
between 1 ug and
1 g) per square
meter per second.
The model is used to predict probability that
a meteorite no larger than mass M will ctrike
exposed area A (n times or lees) during mission
time T:
'^[r-n NtAT
P (Fewer than n strikes) - exp (-N tAT) L T,
r-o
Since larger areas and longer missions imply
that larger meteorites will be encountered, there
is an incentive for reducing transmission tube
size.
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The ponatration resistance of on individual
tube depends on iti wall thicknesi. For the rouge
of meteoroid velocities encountered, impact enor-
gice are dissipated by hydrodynamic shock rather
than by fracture, so that the meteoroid effec-
tively vaporizes on contnct, along with material
in the impact zone. Because of high velocities,
wall thickness required to prevent penetration can
be minimized by saparnting it into two components;
the relatively thick main wnll, and a thin barrier
of sacrificial material placed in front of the
main wall by a buffer space of several meteoroid
diameters or more. The thin wall, referred to as
a bumper, serves to brook up and disperse the
incoming meteorite into a cloud of molten droplets
and smaller fragments which then impact the main
wall over a wide area instead of a single point.
Penetration resistance can thus be incredaed not
only by added mass in the form of more material
thickness, but also by added space, in the form
of wider bumper gaps.
Figure 13 shown the minimum mass combinations
of bumper to main wall thicknese ratio, bumper gap
versus meteoroid diameter b experimentally deter-
mined (22) for aluminum projectiles fired into
aluminum targets at impact velocity V/C - 6 (C
in this case is the speed of sound in the solid
metal). Assuming equivalent meteoroid mass, this
relation can be used to estimate the wall thick-
neea, bumper spacing and thickness required to
prevent tube puncture.
Application of meteoroid survival criteria
results in the array of parallel tuber shown in
Fig. 12. The individual tubes are all unclosed
by a common bumper that is spaced at least a mini-
mum distance away from the outer wall of each
tube. T'Ite array will be arranged in a symmetric
pattern, mnde compact so that a cylindrical bumper
of minimum circumference will enclose it with
adequate spacing, but spread out enough to lower
the probability that a single hit will damage
more than one tube. When individual transmission
tubes are considered, typically more wall thick-
ness is required for meteoroid protection than is
necessary for the power trnnemisnion requirements.
This has negative impact on array mass, but bene-
ficial impact on other aspects, since thicker tube
walls l:nve more cross section and will allow lower
voltages to be used.
STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS - The tether/
transmission line is tl:e element which holds the
constellation together against Lite gravity gradi-
ent of low earth orbit and forces of orbital
flight, perturbations due to anomalies, disturb-
ances caused by station operations such no mass
transfer, docking and so on. While detailed
analysis of tethered space station dynamics
including propulsion system interactions has not
been made, some useful insight can be gained by
considering the simple case (23) of a uniformly
stressed tether in orbit connecting a superorbital
object of mans M to the constellation center of
mass. If R is the superorbital radius traversed
by mass M and Rem is the circular orbit radius
of the entire constellation, the tether material
cross section required at Rem to hold M in
position is given by the expression:
_ ZA As uxp rho& Ceita (R i 2
No	 1 Relt 2 3 Ito3 Item1
	
\	 Item
where the is the material denaity and sig the
tensile strons; Go is the gravitational force at
radiva Ito (zero altitude), and the initial cross
auction As, at superorbital position It, is
relateJ to M by:
	
FICe Ito 2 	It RegA Big R2 Rcm3
At short tether distances the cross-suctional
area and its vorintion are small. The 2 km SP-100
transmission line, for example, line more thnn
enough cross section anyway, due to the meteoroid
survival requirement. Over long tethera, however,
the exponent tern for cross section grows rapidly
and, for materials of normal specific strength
(such as aluminum) the tether must be tapered to
a cross section for in excess of that required for
electrical transmission. If a 250 km tether were
used to separate SP-100 from space station, for
example, its cross section at the station (assum-
ing 10 ksi maximum stress) would be more than 250
times its cruse section at SP-100, just to support
the larger gravity gradient and additional (com-
pounded) tether mass.
For tethers of moderate length (2 to 20 km),
tl:e design process does not need to consider the
structural requirements separately, because tl:e
material cross section required to satisfy elec-
trical and meteoroid survival criteria is more
than adequate to hold the power system against the
centripetal forces of its superorbital position
(the 2 km tether experiences less than 25 psi
stress). For these cases the design process can
be abbreviated to the procedure outlined in
Fig. 14 (opposite page), where tensile loading is
not considered.
ERAFIPLE SPACE STATION TRANSMISSION LINES
The iterative design process (Fig. 14) was
used to generate Luther/transmission line designn
for the nuclear powered apace station. Three
cases, corresponding to tl:e reactor power sources
tabulated previously, were considered:
(1) 100 We transmission line, connecting the
"generic" SP-100 to space station
(2) 300 kWa transmission line for growth
SP-100
(3) 1000 We transmission line that accommo-
dates a megawatt class SP-100 powering the
growth space station
In all three cases, the transmission line require-
ments were:
(1) Two kilometer separation
(2) Transmission lone, with all tubes operat-
ing, lase than two percent
(3) 10 yr reliability (survival probability)
of 0.99 or greater
When this design process was followed, the
transmission line geometry and dimonbions shown to
Figs. 15(a) to (c) resulted. Depending upon por.er
Laval, working voltagou range from 4.5 cc 7.9 a'.
All tubes were sized to a gradient of 20 kV/cm.
The mass estimate for complete transmission line
assemblies was boned on throe conr.ial tubes and a
bumper with additional percentage aosessmantb,
based on material cross section, for the tube and
bunper supports, and an additional fractional
weight, based on annular void volume of each tube,
for standoff insulators and vacuum equipment.
Depending on the power level, transmission line
assembly masses ranged from 422 to 1195 kg/km.
The complete act of transmission line characteris-
tics, including design operating conditions, are
summarized in Table 5.
EXAMPLE SPACE STATION POWER SOURCES
With the transmission lines characterized, it
is possible to estimate the overall sizes, weights
and drag cross sections of tethered reactor power
sources. The tethered SP-100 systems, shown in
Table 6, are adapted from Table 3 by adding the
tether/transmission line and its high voltage
power processing at back end, and substituting the
heavier "shaped shadow" edge attenuation (which
maintains uniform dose plane along space station
orbital track) shield for the original conical
shield. A comparison with the solar sources of
Table 1 illustrates how compact man rated nuclear
power sources can be made through tethering.
Taking the generic SP-100 system weights and
trontal area and combining them with the values
tabulated for the 100 kWe Cranamiesion line, we
obtain a power source that is about half the
weight of either solar system, and lass than half
the drag area this includes the broadside cross
section of the 2 km tether. If we combine the
300 kWe growth SP-100 with the 300 kWe transmis-
sion line, the result is a power source slightly
heavier than the IOC solar system but four times
the capacity. Its drag cross section, including
tether, is still significantly Less (266 versus
531) than the lowest drag (thermal) solar power
source. When drag cross section is used as the
basis for comparison, only the megawatt class
SP-100 and 10GO kWe tether are equivalent to the
80 kWe solar thermal system. This source is three
times as heavy as the solar system; but it
delivers 12.5 times as much power.
All of these sources weigh considerably lees
than the shielding which would be required if the
reactor were mounted near the station. Yet astro-
naut radiation seen onbonrd the station boo been
reduced to essentially the name level no for non-
nuclear oourcea.
COKCL"S1UNS
Tethering, an we have shown in the foregoing
diocuooion, appears to be an eftective way to
integrate the SP-100 nuclear nyaLem with manned
,pace platforms. The advantagen over previoub
reactor power system irtegration methods include
ll) reduced Shield mass and reduced system
mass
(2) greatly reduced astronaut radiation
exposure
(3) reduced operational hasard
Tethering is made possible by the coaxial trnna-
mission tube array, a now element which provides
an efficient means of electrical power transmis-
sion in space with reasonable size ana weight.
The tethured nuclear power sources have signifi-
cant mass and performance advantages over other
power ooutces. Therefore the SP-10U nuclear space
power system should also, when combined with the
tether/transmission line described here, merit
further study as a candidate prime power source
for the manned space station.
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TABLE 1. - IOC SPACE STATION SOLAR "OWER SOURCE'S
JJSC 199.1 ; "Space Station Reference Configuration Description."]
Installed  power
(continuously available)
Photovoltaic
75 kWe
Thermal
80 We
Mass ^a
collectors 4459 kg 2-modules 8400 kg
energy storage 2289 kg (Includes concentrators,
radiators and 489 kg thermal receivers and
heat exchangnre storage, power conversion
and radiators)
PMAD 899 kg 899 kg
Total 8136 kg 9300 kg
Orbital drag 1784 m2 531 m2
cross section
No. exclusion zones none 2
in EVA area
TABLE 2. - SP-100 DESIGN REQUIURMENTS
Power output: (remaining at end of life) 100 We baseline
300 kWo growth
1000 kWe megawatt class
Lifetime: at full power 	 7 yrs
power level unspecified	 10 yro
Radiation: (measured inside shadow,	 fast neutrons	 10 13 nvt
total integrated dose 	 gammas	 5x105 red
deposited in silicon,
done plane loceted 25 m
behind shield)
Safety: meets OSNP-1, "Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space
Nuclear Reactors," DOE
meets N11111700.7A, "Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using
the Space Transportation System," NASA
meets JSC 13830, "Implementation Procedures for 515 Payloads System
Safety Requirements," NASA JSC
meets JPL 601-4 rev A, "JPL Flight Prejects Safety Guidelines and
Requirements," NASA JPL
Reliability: 95 percent probability of success (no failures); no single point
failures
Environment: any sun-relative orientation at 1 AU; any location within
Van Alien belt
Size and weight (co busebar, 100 We system): 3000 kg, and less than 1/3
shuttle cargo bay
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TABLE 3. - MASS SUMMARY FOR REPRESENTATIVE SP-100 SPACL
REACTOR POWER SOURCES
Dlaua,	 kg -100 W —300-kWo 1060-CaWe
Reactor (1100 °K) 400 510 685
Shield (Instrument rated, content shadow) 350 565 950
Power conversion system and hunt transport 1010 2460 6950
(Stirling engine,
	 1.9 Lemperature ratio)
hadiator (500 °K main and auxilary) 730 2190 7300
Power processing (to 400 VDC) 200 460 1125
Structure 270 620 1700
Total 2960
scaling
6805
relationahips.
18710 kg
based on Stochl^and Green (5) and corollary
TABLE 4. - RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE FROM SP-100 (100 We)
at 300-400 km ORBIT
Natural Typical space walk Within Space Station
backgrounds
MEV/cm 2/da
------
REM/hr MEV/cm2/da REM/hrat orbit inclination:
0° 106 0.002 104 2x10-7
30 0 2x10IO .4 2x108 0.004
60 0 —1011 2 ^109 .02
90 0 '1011 1 ^104 .02
Reactor operating Out-of-shiold In shield
gammas cone REM/hr shadow
REM/hr
+100 in reactor 11 0.51
116 1 .051
1000 0.1 .0051
2000 .025 .00125
3160 .010 .00051
10000 .001 .00005
Reactor operating Out-of-shield In shield
font neutrons cone RCM/hr shadow
REM/hr
100 m from reactor 1441 0.42
316 144 .04
1000 14 .004
2000 3.5 .001
3160 1.4 .0004
10000 0.14 100004
a Reference 9 "Space and Planetary Environment Criteria
Guidelines for use in Space Vehicle Development," NASA
TM-82501 and (10) "Models for the Trapped radiation
Environment" NASA SP3024.
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TABLE 5. - SP-100 - 2 km TETIIER/TRANSMISSION
LINE SPECIFICATIONS
100 kWe 300 We 1000 We
Electrical
voltage, kV 4.5 5.6 7.8
current each leg, A 7.4 17.9 42.7
resistance (ohm/km) 1.804 1.154 0.589
(round trip ohms) 7.216 4.616 2.356
capacitance picofarad/km 556 556 556
inductance henry/km 10-12 10-12 10-12
Thermal (250 °K bcakground)
surface temperature,	 °K 253 259 273
core temperature,	 * 9 270 304 353
Mechanical
Mass,	 3 tubes with bumper 660 1050 1841
mounting rings and spacers 85 140 240
vacuum equipment 100 160 308
Total mass of assembly 845 kg 1350 kg 2389 kg
Stress,	 (nominal,	 500 km
circular orbit) 24.7 psi 37 psi 53 psi
Meteoroid Hazard
Survival Probability
(10 yr mission)
ind.+'.victual tube .810 .827 .833
3 out of 3 surviving .531 .566 .572
2 out of 3 surviving .904 .921 .923
1 out of 3 surviving .992 .995 .995
TABLE 6. — TETHERED SP-100 REACTOR POWER SOURCES
100 kwe 300 kWe 1000 kWe
Mass, k8
reactor 400 510 685
shield (instrument rated, 525 848 1425
shaped shadow,
uniform dose plane)
PCS and heat transport 1010 2460 6950
radiator 730 2190 7300
power processing (includes 800 1800 4500
IIV do/de and inverters)
structure 270 620 1700
tether/transmission line 845 1350 2389
assembly
Total 4580 9780 24950
Drag cross section, m2
SP-100 22 66 218
tether 180 200 220
Total 202 266 438
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Figure 1. - Space station reference configu-
ration IOC.
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